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Bridgewater and the Influenza
Epidemic of 1918
William F. Hanna
riday, October 4, 1918 was a beautiful autumn
day, but signs of the distress that gripped the
region were everywhere to be seen. As J.H.
Dickinson, editor and publisher of the Bridgewater
Independent, surveyed the town from his office in
Central Square, he gave expression to the worry and
sorrow felt by many of his neighbors: “It almost seems
like a continuous funeral procession on the street,”
he wrote. “Next to the doctors the undertakers are
the busiest people in town.”
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Although the newspaperman’s grief
was localized, he penned those words
in the midst of an inf luenza pandemic
that became one of the most devastating natural disasters in human history.
In his America’s Forgotten Pandemic:
The Influenza of 1918 (1989), Alfred W.
Crosby approximates American deaths
at 675,000. The U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services reports
that Massachusetts was “ground zero”
of the outbreak in the U.S. with a death
toll of more than 45,000 between
September 1918 and February 1919.
John M. Barry, in The Great Influenza:
The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in
History (2005), notes that the death toll
from inf luenza during that period may
have reached as high as 100 million
worldwide. Bridgewater’s portion of
that cataclysm came quietly but it rapidly overwhelmed both local officials
and the town’s 8,000 residents. Many
had spent the summer of 1918 fully
involved in supporting the American
war effort in Europe, then in its second
year. Fundraising to sustain a host of
patriotic causes was underway, and
planning for the fourth Liberty Loan
drive was in its final stages. Area newspapers published frequent updates on
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Bridgewater boys who were serving in
the military, and local people followed
the news from overseas closely.
Many townspeople had read the
newspaper accounts in early September
reporting on a mounting crisis among
sailors at Boston’s Commonwealth
Pier, as well as in army camps where

Scene from Camp Devens, 1918. In the second
week of September 1918, influenza spread
to Camp Devens outside of Boston, killing
hundreds of men (Photo credit: U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, http://www.flu.
gov/pandemic/history/1918/your_state/northeast/
massachusetts).

medical officers were trying to curb an
outbreak of inf luenza. On September
8, the disease had made its appearance
at Fort Devens, in Ayer, Massachusetts,
and just three weeks later that facility
was inundated with sick men. The base
hospital, built to accommodate 2,000
patients, held 8,000 by month’s end.
Barry writes that Dr. Roy Grist, a medical officer at Devens, told a colleague
that the scene presented at the hospital
“beats any sight they ever had in France
after a battle.” There were also reports
that state health officials were preparing
to confront the inevitable appearance of
the disease among the general public.
Since editor Dickinson’s newspaper
was published only on Fridays, it
is impossible to know when the
first case of inf luenza appeared in
Bridgewater, and this situation is
complicated by the fact that doctors
were not legally required by the state
to report cases of the disease until
October 4. Nevertheless, by September
19, the Brockton Times reported that
inf luenza had made great headway
in Bridgewater, and a day later the
Independent stated that, due to illness
among students and teachers, the
town’s public schools would be
closed during the upcoming week.
Furthermore, Sunday schools would
be closed for two weeks as would the
local theater. During the following
week all public gatherings were
cancelled until further notice.
The campus of the Bridgewater State
Normal School was also feeling effects
of the disease. Fall classes had begun
just a week earlier, but already several
of the approximately 200 students
had gone home suffering from inf luenza. Within a week, the situation had
worsened to the point that on Friday,
September 27, the Independent reported
that although there had been no serious outbreaks among the students,
the maintenance and administrative
staff had been “riddled to pieces in all
departments.” “Thanks to the help of
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Postcard. Bridgewater Central Square, early 1920s (Private Collection of David Moore, Bridgewater, Mass.).

volunteers from among the students,”
said the newspaper, “work has been
kept along but it has been and still is a
trying time for those in authority.”

day and night but were so busy that
they were unable to answer their calls.
Also among the most immediate problems was a critical shortage of nurses.

As the number of cases increased in
Bridgewater, attention turned to Dr.
Albert F. Hunt (1875-1963), chairman
of the town’s Board of Health (and the
man after whom the university’s Hunt
Hall is named). A graduate of Brown
University (1899) and the Harvard
Medical School (1907), Hunt was also
a member of the town’s school committee and the Chief Medical Officer
at the Normal School. On September
25, Hunt presided over a meeting of
the Board at which an Emergency
Citizens’ Committee was appointed
to help manage the town’s response
to the worsening crisis. Reporting on
September 27, the Independent noted
that Hunt had said that during the
previous two weeks inf luenza had
“scourged the town.” Doctors worked

Although the disease affected all parts
of Bridgewater, neighborhoods with
the largest numbers of foreign-born
residents were hit hardest. This was
especially true of the area surrounding the Stanley Ironworks complex,
located on High Street, along the banks
of the Town River. Immigrants from
Italy and Portugal accounted for a large
number of the company’s labor force in
that era, and on Thursday, September
26, the Brockton Enterprise reported
that 200 workers were absent due to
sickness. The paper noted that because
of high absenteeism, the company
was unable to get a full day’s labor
from the day shift, and had suspended
work entirely on the night shift. The
Enterprise also reported that the Perkins
iron foundry and the L.Q. White shoe
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factory, both of which relied heavily on
immigrant labor, had been forced by
high absenteeism to reduce output.
One of the first measures undertaken
by the crisis committee was to establish
an emergency hospital in the midst
of the hardest-hit area. The Stanley
Company offered the use of the
bottom tenement at the Riverside
House, located on Wall Street, near its
intersection with High Street. With
incidental expenses paid by the company, the hospital held 11 beds and
when it opened on Friday, September
27, it was immediately filled to capacity with men, women and children,
including some who were critically
ill with inf luenza or the resulting
pneumonia. A nurse sent by the state
had arrived from Brighton on the
previous evening, and two others,
including one who had been secured by
the Stanley ironworks, soon followed.
These nurses, along with several local
volunteers, staffed the hospital. In its
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Stunned by the magnitude of the epidemic, Americans searched for plausible
explanations as to how such a calamity
could happen. A Boston Globe headline
on September 19 speculated that “Men
from U-Boats May Have Scattered
Germs.” The accompanying story
quoted a federal health official, who
warned: “The Germans have started
epidemics in Europe, and there is no
reason why they should be particularly
gentle with America.” Gina Kolata, in
her 1995 book Flu: The Story of the Great
Influenza Pandemic of 1919 and the Search
for the Virus that Caused It, mentions the
submarine rumors as well as the suspicion that Germans had smuggled Bayer
aspirin tainted with inf luenza germs
into the United States. Reality, however, was much less dramatic. In fact,
this was the second and much deadlier
outbreak of inf luenza in 1918. After
first appearing in a milder form during
the spring, a second and much more
virulent strain of the disease emerged
in late summer. It would have brought
little comfort to Americans in that anxious autumn of 1918 to know that the
disease would be gone by the spring of
1919 and reappear only brief ly in 1920.

Map of Crapo Street and Ball Avenue Neighborhood, Bridgewater, Mass., 1931 (Digital Sanborn
Maps, 1867-1970, Sheet #13. Accessed in Special Collections, Maxwell Library, Bridgewater State
University). By 1931, the neighborhood had changed very little from the days when it was wracked
by influenza.

As Bridgewater tried to bring the outbreak under control, a beleaguered Dr.
Hunt found himself the target of critics
who thought that more should be done
to end the emergency. On September
26, the Enterprise claimed that Dr.
Hunt “cannot find time to properly
handle his work,” and a few days later
the newspaper continued that theme
when it said: “There is a feeling among
well informed people that the board
of health should take more active steps
toward fighting the disease.”

report, the Bridgewater Emergency
Committee stated that despite their best
efforts some of the patients at Riverside
were beyond help, and five died within
a few days of their admissions. The
report also noted that it was often
necessary for the nurses to work from
24 to 72 hours without the benefit of
sustained rest. On Friday, September

While the same edition of the Enterprise
noted that in Bridgewater the “f lu
continues to reap its quota of victims,
especially among the foreign born,” it
was to those immigrant communities
that town officials devoted most of their
available resources. It was also in those
neighborhoods that the urgency of the
situation frequently came into conf lict
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27, one of the nurses along with a
member of the Emergency Committee
visited houses on Crapo Street and
Ball Avenue where, officials later
reported, “epidemic conditions were
probably worse than in any other part
of Bridgewater.” Only the nursing
shortage prevented the opening of
another hospital in that vicinity.
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A late-life picture of Dr. Albert F. Hunt and
Mrs. Hunt, Bridgewater, Mass. (Courtesy
of Bridgewater magazine, Marketing and
Communications Department, Bridgewater
State University).

with longstanding cultural traditions of
the residents. On October 4, even as the
Bridgewater Independent reported that the
situation seemed somewhat improved,
Dr. Hunt voiced a frustration widely
felt among his colleagues in the medical profession. Badly overworked and
under a great deal of stress, he charged
that within the immigrant neighborhoods, “The ignorance manifested of
even ordinary health precautions is
unbelievable … to those who have had
it to deal with. Many totally disregard
the instructions of the physicians and
nurses.” When a member of the family shows signs of illness, he said, “the
house is shut up tight and the neighbors, men, women and children, f lock
in and sit around, sometimes remaining
for hours.” When a f lu victim died, said
Hunt, the situation became even more
dangerous because the family would
often wait several hours before calling
the undertaker.
On Friday, October 4, when the
Government of Massachusetts required
that physicians report all new cases of
the disease, placards were placed on
houses of the sick in the more congested
areas of Bridgewater where infection
was most prevalent. This served as
notice of quarantine, and to enforce it
the State Guard—a volunteer force
that replaced the National Guard after
it was federalized for wartime duty—
was called out to patrol those
May 2016

neighborhoods in order to prevent anyone from visiting the placarded houses.
The Enterprise reported that this caused
hardship among some immigrants
because there were often cases where
several roomed together, and those who
were not sick were denied entrance
if one of their housemates displayed
symptoms of the disease. Nevertheless,
shortly thereafter, an unidentified doctor who had been sent from
Washington, D.C. inspected quarantined houses on Crapo Street and also
visited workers at the L.Q. White shoe
factory. He reported to the Emergency
Committee that thanks to the measures
that had been undertaken, the situation
was improving.
The tide turned quickly. In the last days
of September 1918, even as the death
toll continued to rise among those who
had earlier contracted the disease, fewer
and fewer new cases of inf luenza were
reported, and by the end of the first
week in October the worst of the crisis
had passed. On October 4, a second
hospital had opened at the Hudnut
house, located at the corner of Grove
and Bedford streets. Holding 20 beds,
it was used primarily as a convalescent
home and a nursery for children who
were either waiting for their mothers to recover or for placement in
foster homes. By the time it closed on
October 12, the Independent reported
that the Riverside hospital had
already been shut down and that
the doctors and nurses from out of
town had departed.
Historians who attempt to calculate
Bridgewater’s losses in the epidemic
face the same difficulty as those who
try to estimate worldwide damage.
Thanks to the untold thousands of
unreported cases, as well as to the
urgency and magnitude of the crisis,
we are left with approximations. But by
any reckoning, the results were devastating. For example, the handwritten
ledger book kept by the Bridgewater
Board of Health during the crisis lists
only 290 reported cases of inf luenza.

Yet the official report issued by the
Emergency Citizens’ Committee—a
much more reliable source—states that
its conservative estimate was 2,000
cases. Similarly, town records show that
45 local people succumbed to inf luenza
in the ten weeks between September
13 and November 23, 1918. However,
since many f lu victims died of pneumonia, and since doctors were not required
to report cases of inf luenza separately
until October 4, it is reasonable to
speculate that at least some of the deaths
attributed to pneumonia were part of
the inf luenza epidemic. This is very
likely to have been true, because from
September 18 until October 2, 1918,
another 13 townspeople died of pneumonia, a much higher number than in
other years. Like their fellow victims
worldwide, most of the Bridgewater
dead were in the prime of their lives
when death called. The Citizens’
Committee Report states their average
age as just 27 years.
Within weeks of the end of the crisis,
an armistice was signed concluding World War I. Schools reopened,
religious communities gathered again,
the Normal School students were back
at their desks, and factories returned
to full production. Local boys came
home from the military and life again
resumed the quiet pace familiar to
many small towns. Even so, no one
who lived through the inf luenza
pandemic of 1918 ever forgot it. They
carried the fearful memories, the
uncertainty, and the ineffable sadness
with them always, even as the disaster
itself passed into history.
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